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The new probabilistic approaches to the natural language conditional imply that there
is a parallel relation between indicative conditionals (ICs) “if s then b” and conditional
bets (CBs) “I bet $1 that if s then b” in two aspects. First, the probability of an IC
and the probability of winning a CB are both the conditional probability, P(s|b). Second,
both an IC and a CB have a third value “void” (neither true nor false, neither wins nor
loses) when the antecedent is false (¬s). These aspects of the parallel relation have
been found in Western participants. In the present study, we investigated whether this
parallel is also present in Eastern participants. We replicated the study of Politzer et al.
(2010) with Chinese and Japanese participants and made two predictions. First, Eastern
participants will tend to engage in more holistic cognition and take all possible cases,
including ¬s, into account when they judge the probability of conditional: Easterners
may assess the probability of antecedent s out of all possible cases, P(s), and then
may focus on consequent b out of s, P(b|s). Consequently, Easterners may judge the
probability of the conditional, and of winning the bet, to be P(s) ∗ P(b|s) = P(s & b),
and false/losing the bet as P(s) ∗ P(¬b|s) = P(s & ¬b). Second, Eastern participants will
tend to be strongly affected by context, and they may not show parallel relationships
between ICs and CBs. The results indicate no cultural differences in judging the false
antecedent cases: Eastern participants judged false antecedent cases as not making
the IC true nor false and as not being winning or losing outcomes. However, there were
cultural differences when asked about the probability of a conditional. Consistent with
our hypothesis, Eastern participants had a greater tendency to take all possible cases
into account, especially in CBs. We discuss whether these results can be explained
by a hypothesized tendency for Eastern people to think in more holistic and context-
dependent terms than Western people.
Keywords: new paradigm psychology of reasoning, indicative conditionals, bets on conditionals, de Finetti table,
cultural differences
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INTRODUCTION
The new Bayesian and probabilistic accounts of the natural
language indicative conditional (IC) have become increasingly
influential in the psychology of reasoning. The older binary
account of reasoning was based on binary logic and classified
propositions as simply true or false. Such a classification,
however, is too simple for most ordinary and scientific reasoning,
which takes place in a context of uncertainty, where many
propositions are neither certainly true nor certainly false. In
contrast, the new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning
recognizes that people have degrees of belief in propositions,
which are technically subjective probabilities and that this affects
even the fundamental logic of their reasoning (Oaksford and
Chater, 2007, 2010; Over, 2009; Politzer et al., 2010; Baratgin
et al., 2013; Baratgin and Politzer, 2016; Over and Baratgin, 2017).
In this new approach, the probability of an IC of natural
language P(if p then q) is equal to the conditional probability
of q given p, P(q|p), and not to the probability of the formal
conditional of binary logic, which is logically equivalent to not-
p or q. The statement that P(if p then q) is not P(not-p or q)
but rather P(q|p), P(if p then q) = P(q|p), is often called the
Equation, because it has such far-reaching implications for a
Bayesian account of conditional reasoning. It is based on logical
and philosophical studies of conditionals (Ramsey, 1929/1990;
Edgington, 1995; Adams, 1998), which suggest that people assess
P(if p then q) by hypothetically supposing p and then judging
the probability of q given under this supposition of p, a process
that is called the Ramsey test. If the Equation holds, then a
Bayesian account of conditional reasoning will follow, with
Bayesian probability theory, and not binary logic, as the new
normative standard, a new paradigm, for conditional reasoning
(Evans and Over, 2004; Oaksford and Chater, 2007; Pfeifer and
Kleiter, 2010; Baratgin and Politzer, 2016). Also in this new
approach, a conditional can have a third value, “neither true nor
false (void),” in addition to truth or falsity, when its antecedent is
false. We will follow recent practice and call the resulting truth
table a de Finetti table, after de Finetti (1936/1995) who first
proposed it (see Baratgin et al., 2013, 2014). The Equation has
been very strongly supported for people’s probability judgments
about natural language conditionals if p then q, at least when
p and q are not independent of each other (Evans et al., 2003;
Oberauer and Wilhelm, 2003; Over et al., 2007; Douven and
Verbrugge, 2010; 2013; Fugard et al., 2011; Singmann et al.,
2014; Baratgin et al., 2017). For an even longer time, there has
been confirmation of the de Finetti table, traditionally called the
“defective” truth table, as descriptive of people’s judgments about
ICs (Over and Baratgin, 2017). Note that Jeffrey (1991) proposed
a many-valued extension of the de Finetti table, the Jeffrey table.
This proposal is an important generalization that is arguably
found in de Finetti himself, and it should be investigated in future
research (Over and Baratgin, 2017).
The new approach implies in turn that there should be a close
parallel relation between the assertion of an IC and a conditional
bet (CB) as a speech act (de Finetti, 1937/1964; Politzer et al.,
2010; Baratgin et al., 2013). Making a connection between betting,
including CBs, and subjective probability theory goes right back
to the origin of contemporary subjective probability theory,
together with the use of betting quotients to represent degrees
of belief and the Dutch book arguments to justify the axioms
of probability theory (Ramsey, 1926/1990; de Finetti, 1937/1964,
1974). The parallel relation between an IC and a CB can easily be
illustrated with an example:
(1) If it rains in Kobe tomorrow, the baseball match will be
called off.
(2) I bet that, if it rains in Kobe tomorrow, the baseball match
will be called off.
Suppose a Kobe baseball fan asserts (1) and then goes on to
(2) in an argument with someone who denies (1). Such speech
acts often occur together, or interchangeably, in discussions and
debates about singular matters of fact (see Cruz and Oberauer,
2014, on general conditionals). In more detail, the parallel
relation is as follows. The fan’s assertion (1) is true, and she wins
her bet (2), when it rains in Kobe, and the match is called off.
The fan’s assertion (1) is false, and she loses her bet (2), when it
rains in Kobe, and the match is not called off. The fan’s indicative
assertion is not shown to be true or false, and she neither wins
nor loses her bet when it does not rain in Kobe. In this case,
the IC and CB are both void. No actual fact makes the indicative
assertion true or false, and the CB is called off, with no money
changing hands. In any case, the probability that (1) holds is the
conditional probability that the baseball match will be called off
given that it rains in Kobe tomorrow. The probability that the
fan will win her CB (2) is also this conditional probability, which
is indeed the fair betting quotient for the bet. The conditional
probability can be determined by means of the Ramsey test, which
is to suppose that it will rain tomorrow in Kobe and then to infer,
under this supposition, a degree of belief that the baseball match
will be called off (Ramsey, 1929/1990; Edgington, 1995).
The new paradigm implies that there should be this parallel
relation between conditional assertions, like (1), and CBs, like
(2), and Politzer et al. (2010) have investigated whether people’s
judgments are broadly in line with it. They used an IC and
CB about a randomly selected chip from a given frequency
distribution of chips that were square or circular and black or
white:
(3) If the chip is square (s), then it is black (b).
(4) I bet you 1 Euro that if the chip is square, then it is black.
More than 60% of their participants did respond that the
probability of the IC (3), of the form if s then b, and the probability
of winning the CB (4), of the form I bet that if s then b, were both
equal to the conditional probability, P(b|s). More than 50% of the
participants also judged that the false antecedent outcomes, ¬s &
b and ¬s & ¬b, made the IC neither true nor false and resulted
in a CB being neither won nor lost. There was no evidence that
the participants interpreted the IC as the material conditional of
elementary formal logic, which is logically equivalent to not-s or b,
and no evidence that they interpreted the CB as a bet on not-s or b.
There were, however, some responses that are hard to classify.
About 15% of the participants judged that the probabilities of the
IC and the CB were equal to conjunctive probability P(s & b).
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And in false antecedent ¬s & b and ¬s & ¬b cases, 28% of the
participants judged that the IC is false, and 10% of participants
judged that the CB is lost. These conjunctive responses are
clearly inconsistent with any reasonable normative theory of the
conditional, but have been found in other experiments on ICs
like (3), which are about randomly selected objects from artificial
frequency distributions (e.g., Evans et al., 2003). Conjunctive
responses are not found at all when probability judgments
are made about everyday conditionals that are not about such
frequency distributions, e.g., “If global warming continues, then
Hamburg will be flooded” (Over et al., 2007; Singmann et al.,
2014). Even so, the conjunctive response must obviously be
explained for the contents and contexts in which it occurs.
Politzer et al. (2010) suggested that some people might
respond with the conjunctive probability, P(s & b), because
it takes fewer mental steps to process it than the conditional
probability, P(b|s), when an unfamiliar frequency distribution is
being referred to. To respond with P(s & b), one only has to
consider the total number of s & b chips out of all the chips,
but to derive P(b|s), one must first restrict one’s attention to
the s chips alone and then consider the proportion of these
chips are s & b chips. The former process is easier than the
latter. This explanation is supported by the results of other
studies of ICs. Conjunctive responses tend to decline and become
replaced by conditional probability responses as participants
become more practiced at making these probability judgments
about initially unfamiliar frequency distributions (Fugard et al.,
2011). Studies of individual differences show that conditional
probability responders are of higher cognitive ability than
conjunctive probability responders (Evans et al., 2007; Oberauer
et al., 2007).
These results on conjunctive responders and ICs may not
transfer to CBs. Betting is a social activity that is about winning
or losing money or some other utility. It may be that there are
special reasons, individual or cultural, why some people give the
conjunctive response to questions about CBs, and yet there are
only two studies of them (Politzer et al., 2010; Baratgin et al.,
2013). These studies are also restricted to participants in Western
Europe. There is certainly a need for further studies of both
ICs and CBs in non-Western cultures, as there are claims about
cultural differences in cognition in the literature that have some
support.
Nisbett and his collaborators (Nisbett et al., 2001; Nisbett and
Masuda, 2003; Nisbett and Miyamoto, 2005) have argued, on
the basis of their results, that Westerners are more engaged in
analytic and context-independent cognition, and Easterners are
more concerned with holistic and context-dependent cognition
and also what is termed “naïve dialecticism.” For example,
studies of scene cognition (Masuda and Nisbett, 2001) found
that American participants separated a salient object from its
background and focused on it, while Japanese participants
combined the salient object and the background and paid more
attention to the scene as a whole.
Norenzayan et al. (2002) studied cultural differences in
syllogistic reasoning. In their study, East Asian (Korean)
participants showed stronger belief bias than European and
American participants, although there were no cultural
differences in logical accuracy for abstract arguments. They
concluded that there are not cultural differences in logical
reasoning ability, but rather cultural differences in context
dependency.
There are also claimed differences in interpreting
contradictions and compliance with binary logic. It has
been argued that Easterners tend to be inclined to “naïve
dialecticism” (Peng and Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers et al.,
2009, 2010). In this view, the universe is in a state of flux and
alternates between opposites (e.g., good becomes bad, but then
bad becomes good). Naïve dialectical thinkers are tolerant
of apparent contradictions and have a belief that the “truth”
is often somewhere in the middle. In contrast, Westerners
are supposedly guided by the law of non-contradiction, and
a belief that all propositions must be either true or false,
and are more inclined to follow binary logic to evaluate
propositions. “Dialecticism,” so defined, appears to some extent
in line with the new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning
and its use of probability theory, and not truth functional
logic, as the normative standard for conditional reasoning.
Easterners’ conditional reasoning might then conform more to
a probabilistic account of conditionals, with a greater tendency
to judge the probability of a conditional as the conditional
probability and to evaluate false antecedent cases as void. On
the other hand, “void” expresses a tolerance for what is not
factually true or false, and it might be that Easterners take
a view of void outcomes different from that of Westerners.
Hence, Easterners’ interpretation of the probability of a
conditional might differ from Westerners’ interpretation. This
possibility has not yet been investigated in a cross-cultural
study. Possible cultural differences may or may not affect the
understanding and evaluation of ICs, and CBs, but if they do, a
full theory of conditional reasoning would have to account for
them.
OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTS
Our study of conditionals recruited Chinese and Japanese
participants as Easterners, and replicated the same experimental
paradigm as in Politzer et al. (2010), who had French participants.
The participants were presented with an IC or a CB, and asked
to judge the probability that the IC was true, or false, and the
probability of winning, or losing, the CB. They were also asked
to evaluate the truth value of the IC, if s then b, in false antecedent
¬s cases, and to judge whether the CB was won, lost, or called
off in these cases. Norenzayan et al. (2002) showed that there
were no cultural differences in an abstract syllogistic reasoning.
Therefore, it is possible that there are no cultural differences
in the understanding abstract conditionals, and Easterners may
understand a conditional if s then b as suppositional as b given s.
However, in light of the literature referred to the above,
there are two hypotheses to consider about possible differences
in conditional reasoning between Easterners and Westerners.
The first hypothesis is that Easterners tend to engage more
in holistic cognition about the conditional, viewing all the
logical possibilities, including the false antecedent ¬s cases, as
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relevant to its evaluation. Because Easterners tend to engage in
naïve dialecticism and have greater tolerance of inconsistency
(Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009), they may evaluate ¬s cases
as relevant when they judge the probability of a conditional,
or of winning/losing the bet, even though they understand a
conditional as suppositional as b given s and evaluate ¬s cases
as void (neither true nor false, neither wins nor loses). We predict
that Easterners might make holistic responses. When Easterners
think about the probability of conditional if s then b, they might
pick s chips out of all chips, P(s), before they focus on b chips
out of s chips, P(b|s). Therefore, Easterners may judge that the
probability of the conditional being true, and the probability of
a win, is equal to P(s) ∗ P(b|s) = P(s & b), and the probability of
conditional being false, and of losing, is P(s) ∗ P(¬b|s) = P(s &
¬b). Note that the holistic way of determining P(s & b), which
takes a subset of a subset [specifically, b|s out of s, or equivalently,
P(s) ∗ P(b|s)], is different from the conjunctive response P(s & b),
which just focuses on the number of s & b chips out of the total
number of all chips.
The second hypothesis, which might hold along with the first
or on its own, is that Easterners are more strongly affected by
contextual information (Norenzayan et al., 2002) and they may
evaluate bets, and specifically CBs, differently from Westerners.
As we have already pointed out, betting is a social activity,
which may vary between cultures. With supposedly more holistic
thought, Easterners might again consider ¬s cases as relevant to
the evaluation of the CB, a bet on if s then b. They might consider
a ¬s case as a losing outcome, because no money is won, and
not as a neither winning nor losing, void outcome. There would
then be relatively more conjunctive responses among Easterners
for CBs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We investigated the above two hypotheses using the approach
of Politzer et al. (2010) with Chinese and Japanese participants.
The experimental procedure was identical with that of Politzer
et al. (2010). The participants were presented with an IC If
the chip is square, then it is black, and a CB I bet you U100
that if the chip is square, then it is black about a randomly
selected chip from a distribution of square or circular and
black or white chips (Figure 1). Seven chips were shown to
them: three square and black chips, one square and white chip,
two circular and black chips, and one circular and white chip.
The relevant conditional probabilities were thus P(b|s) = 3/4
and P(¬b|s) = 1/4. The probability of the conjunction was
P(s & b) = 3/7 and P(¬(s & b)) = 4/7, and the probability
of the material conditional was P(¬s or b) = 6/7, with P(s &
¬b) = 1/7. There is also the expected value (EV) of the CB to
keep in mind, which is given by EV = P(s & b)(100) + P(s &
¬b)(−100)+ P(¬s)(0) = (3/7)(100)+ (1/7)(−100) = 29. Clearly,
this is not a fair bet, which would otherwise have an EV of 0,
and which would come from odds of 3 to 1 given by the fair
betting quotient for this CB, P(b|s) = 3/4. But many of the bets
that ordinary people enter into, as in a casino, are not fair in this
strict sense.
FIGURE 1 | The display of the chips and the conditional sentences in the
indicative conditional and the conditional bet conditions in the experiment.
Participants1
Chinese participants were 175 undergraduate students of
Zhejiang University of Media and Communications (38 male, 137
female, Mage = 19.0, SDage = 1.4). Japanese participants were 197
undergraduate students of Osaka City University and Hokkaido
University (85 male, 110 female, 2 unknown, Mage = 20.1,
SDage = 3.2). The experiment was conducted anonymously and
we obtained written informed consent from all participants. This
study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations
of “Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, The
American Psychological Association.”
Materials
We translated the experimental material used in Politzer et al.’s
(2010) study (Groups 1–6) into Chinese and Japanese. There were
six questions about chips in the two colors (white or black) and
two shapes (circular or square), along with conditional statements
about the chips. Questions 1–4 were about three circular chips
(two black and one white) and four square chips (three black and
one white). Question 5 and 6 were about four circular chips (one
black and four white) and three square chips (one black and two
white).
1 French participants in Politzer et al.’s (2010) study completed high school and
0–10 years in higher education (average was 4 years). Both Chinese and Japanese
students have fewer years of higher education than the French. But in China and
Japan, there are selection competitions to enter universities, which is not the case
in France. Overall, we can consider that these populations are comparable.
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Design
Participants were randomly allocated to four groups. Groups 1
and 2 received the IC, If the chip is square, then it is black, and
they answered six questions about IC. Groups 3–6 received a CB,
in the form Ms. X says to Mr. Y, I bet you U100 that if the chip is
square, then it is black, and answered six questions about CB.
Questions 1 and 2 (Probability Judgment)
Groups 1 and 2 were asked to judge the probability that the
IC is true or false. Question 1 was: what are the chances that
the sentence is true? Question 2 was: what are the chances that
the sentence is false? Groups 3–6 were asked for the probability
that Ms. X would win or lose her bet. Question 1 for them was:
what are the chances that Ms. X will win her bet? Question 2
for them was: what are the chances that Ms. X will lose her bet?
Participants were asked to write down the mathematical formula
for calculating the probability.
Questions 3 and 4
Evaluation of ¬s Cases
Groups 1–4 were presented with the false antecedent outcomes.
Question 3 was about ¬s & b outcome: suppose that the chosen
chip is round and black. Question 4 was about ¬s & ¬b outcome:
suppose that the chosen chip is round and white. Groups 1 and 2
were asked whether the conditional was true or false, and Groups
3 and 4 were asked whether the CB was won or lost in false
antecedent cases. Group 1 had a two-option question: do you
think that the sentence is true, or false? Group 2 had a three-
option question: do you think that the sentence is true, false, or
neither true nor false (void)? Group 3 had a two-option question
about whether Ms. X won or lost her bet. Group 4 had a three-
option question about whether Ms. X won, lost, or had her bet
called off (made void). For example, Group 4 had the following
for Question 4. Suppose that the drawn chip is round and black.
Do you think that Ms. X wins her bet, loses her bet, or nobody wins
(the bet is called off)?
Probability of b and ¬b Cases
Groups 5 and 6 were also given the CB, and they were asked
to make a judgment under the supposition that the chosen chip
was a black, a b outcome, or that it was white, a ¬b outcome.
Group 5 was asked to judge the probability of wining the bet
given that the chip is black P(win|b) in Question 3, and then they
were asked the probability of losing the bet given that the chip is
black P(lose|b) in Question 4. For example, “Suppose that the chip
is black. What are the chances that Ms. X wins her bet?” Group
6 was asked to judge the probability of wining the bet given that
the chip is white, P(win|¬b), in Question 3, and then they were
asked the probability of losing the bet given that the chip is white,
P(lose|¬b) in Question 4. For example, “Suppose the chip is white.
What are the chances that Ms. X wins her bet?”
Questions 5 and 6
Questions 5 and 6 were given to all groups and in a
counterbalanced order. To avoid a possible effect of training,
these questions were about a different set of chips: three
square chips, one black and two white, and four circular chips,
one black and three white. These questions were about the
probability of the conjunction, P(s & b) and about the conditional
probability, P(b|s). The aim of these questions was to test
whether the participants could distinguish a request to evaluate
the probability of conjunction from a request to evaluate the
conditional probability.
RESULTS
We include the French data from Politzer et al. (2010) in
Tables 1–3, in order to test the differences between Easterners
and Westerners.
Questions 1 and 2 (Probability Judgment)
Table 1 shows the percentage of answers to the probability
judgment task in Groups 1–6. We included in this table an entry
for holistic 1 and holistic 2 responses. Holistic 1 response was
defined to be the ones that focus on the probability of the true
or winning case P(s) ∗ P(b|s) = P(s & b) = 3/7, and of the false or
losing case P(s) ∗ P(¬b|s) = P(s & ¬b) = 1/7. Some participants
calculated that the probability of a conditional is true/win with
the following formula, P(s) ∗ P(b|s) = 4/7 ∗ 3/4 = 3/7, and
calculated that the probability of a conditional is false/lose as
1 – 3/7 = 4/7. Because this calculation is of the same nature of
holistic 1 response, different from conjunction, we counted this
response as holistic 2 response, and not as conjunctive probability
response.
In this and subsequent analysis, we used 2 ∗ 3 Fisher’s exact
test to compare response frequencies because there were a small
number of response in some categories (i.e., the number of
holistic responses in French was 0 in IC condition). For example,
to compare frequency of conditional probability response in IC,
we conducted a 2 ∗ 3 Fisher’s exact test; 2 (response category:
conditional probability response, non-conditional probability
response) ∗ 3 (nationality: French, Chinese, Japanese). When
there were differences in response frequency, we conducted a 2
∗ 2 Fisher’s exact test for pairwise comparison three times that
were 2 (response category) ∗ 2 (nationality: French, Chinese),
2 (response category) ∗ 2 (nationality: French, Japanese), and
2 (response category) ∗ 2 (nationality: Chinese, Japanese).
In pairwise comparison, we apply Bonferroni correction for
multiple test and p-value was set to less than 0.0167 (0.05/3) to
be significant at the p < 0.05 level.
The frequency of conditional probability response did not
differ between the three countries in IC (p > 0.05), but there
were differences in CB (p < 0.001). In CB, the frequency of
conditional probability response was greater in French than in
Chinese (p < 0.001) and in Japanese (p < 0.001), but there was
no difference between Chinese and Japanese (p > 0.05). There
were no differences between the three countries in the frequency
of conjunctive probability response and the frequency of material
implication response both in IC and in CB (p > 0.05). As we
predicted, we observed significant differences in the frequency
of the holistic response (holistic 1 and holistic 2) both in IC
(p < 0.001) and in CB (p < 0.001). The frequency of the holistic
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TABLE 1 | Percentage of responses of French, Chinese, and Japanese participants in probability judgment task (Questions 1 and 2).
Response category Indicative conditional Conditional bet
French Chinese Japanese French Chinese Japanese
Conditional probability (3/4 for true/win, 1/4 for false/lose) 69 51 62 61 37 36
Conjunctive probability (3/7 for true/win, 4/7 for false/lose) 14 7 8 16 9 18
Material implication (6/7 for true/win, 1/7 for false/lose) 2 0 3 2 1 4
Holistic 0 15 16 2 25 30
Holistic 1 (3/7 for true/win, 1/7for false/lose) (0) (7) (14) (1) (11) (15)
Holistic 2 (4/7 ∗ 3/4 = 3/7 for true/win, 1 − 3/7 = 4/7 for false/lose) (0) (8) (2) (1) (14) (15)
Other 15 27 11 19 28 12
response was greater in Chinese and in Japanese than in French,
but there were no differences between Chinese and Japanese
both in IC (French and Chinese p < 0.05, French and Japanese
p < 0.01, Chinese and Japanese p > 0.05) and in CB (French
and Chinese p < 0.001, French and Japanese p < 0.001, Chinese
and Japanese p > 0.05). In sum, there were cultural differences
in response frequency in judging the probability of conditionals.
Whereas the conditional probability response was given more
often by the French participants than by the Eastern participants
(in both conditions, but significantly so only in CB), the holistic
response was given more often by the Eastern participants than
by the French participants (significant both in IC and in CB).
Questions 3 and 4 in Groups 1–4
(Evaluation of ¬s Cases)
Table 2 shows the distribution of the answers for evaluating
¬s outcomes in Groups 1 and 3 (two-choice questions) and
Groups 2 and 4 (three-choice questions). Note that Groups 1
and 3 presented two-choice option questions such as “Do you
think that the sentence is true or false?” some participants did not
select options but wrote down third options such as “neither true
nor false” or “neither wins nor loses” and we categorized these
responses as “void.” Therefore, we included “void” choices as
well as true/win and false/lose responses for analyzing response
frequencies.
As for the response frequency for two-choice questions
(Groups 1 and 3) in IC, there were no differences between
the three countries in true for both, false for both, and mixed
(p > 0.05). There was a significant difference in one for true
and one for false response (p < 0.05), while pairwise comparison
showed no statistically significant difference. We also observed a
significant difference in the frequency of “void” for both response
(p < 0.05), but no statistically significant difference in pairwise
comparison. Groups 1 and 3 in CB showed no difference between
the three countries in all response categories (win for both, lose
for both, win for one and lose for the other, “void” for both,
p > 0.05).
Three-choice questions (Groups 2 and 4) showed no
significant differences between the three countries in all response
categories both in IC (true for both, false for both, true for one
and false for the other, and void for both, p> 0.05) and in CB (win
for both, lose for both, true for one and false for the other, and
void for both, p > 0.05). In sum, there was no cultural difference
in evaluation of truth value of false antecedent outcomes, and the
modal response was void in three-choice option questions.
Questions 3 and 4 in Groups 5 and 6
(About b and ¬b Cases)
Table 3 shows the distribution of the answers for Questions 3 and
4 in Groups 5 and 6. Group 5 was asked to suppose the chip is
black (b) and to estimate the probability of winning (Q3) or losing
(Q4) the bet. Group 6 was asked to suppose the chip is white (¬b)
and to estimate the probability of winning (Q3) or losing (Q4)
the bet.
In Question 3 in Group 5 (probability of winning in black
chip), there was a difference in frequency of response “1 (100%)”
(p < 0.01) and the frequency of response “1 (100%)” was
greater in Japanese than in French (p < 0.01), but there was
no difference between French and Chinese and Chinese and
Japanese (p > 0.05). In frequency of responses “3/5” and “3/4,”
there was no difference between the three countries (p > 0.05).
There was a significant difference in frequency of response “5/7”
(p < 0.05), but pairwise comparison showed no significant
differences.
In Question 4 in Group 5 (probability of losing in black
chip), there were differences in frequency of response “0 (0%)”
(p < 0.001) frequency of response “0 (0%)” was greater in
Japanese than in French (p < 0.001) and in Chinese (p < 0.001),
but there were no differences between French and Chinese
(p > 0.05). We also observed differences in the frequency of
response “2/5” (p < 0.01): the frequency of response “2/5”
was greater in French than in Japanese (p < 0.01) and greater
in Chinese than in Japanese (p < 0.01), but there were no
differences between French and Chinese (p > 0.05). There were
no significant differences in frequency of response “3/4” and
response “1/4” (p > 0.05). Together with these results, there
were cultural differences in judging the probability of winning
or losing in b outcomes: Japanese participants more frequently
judged that the probability of winning in b was 100% and the
probability of losing in b was 0%, but less frequently judged that
the probability of losing in b was 2/5.
Question 3 in Group 6 (probability of winning in white chip)
showed no difference between the three countries in all response
categories (p > 0.05 for responses “0,” “1/2,” “2/7,” and “1/4”).
In Question 4 in Group 6 (probability of losing in white chip),
there was a difference in frequency of response “1/2” (p< 0.001),
and pairwise comparison indicated that the frequency of response
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TABLE 2 | Percentage of responses of French, Chinese, and Japanese participants in ¬s evaluation task (Questions 3 and 4 in Groups 1–4).
Indicative conditional Conditional bet
French Chinese Japanese French Chinese Japanese
Groups 1 and 3: two-choice option
True/win for both questions 37 24 30 13 32 19
False/lose for both questions 47 48 43 40 22 47
True/win for one false/lose for the other 3 24 24 20 32 19
Neither true nor false/void to both questions∗ 13 0 0 27 7 12
Mixed 0 4 3 0 7 3
Groups 2 and 4: three-choice option
True/win for both questions 7 7 8 7 3 6
False/lose for both questions 28 13 19 10 0 13
True/win for one false/lose for the other 3 4 3 3 14 6
Neither true nor false/void to both questions 52 63 54 79 80 75
Mixed 10 13 16 0 3 0
∗This is spontaneous expression of the third option.
TABLE 3 | Percentage of responses of French, Chinese, and Japanese participants in probability judgment about b or ¬b outcomes (Questions 3 and 4 in Groups 5
and 6).
Q3. Suppose the chip
is black. What are the
chances that Mary
wins her bet?
French Chinese Japanese Q4. Suppose the chip
is black. What are the
chances that Mary
loses her bet?
French Chinese Japanese
Group 5
1 (or 100%) 0 17 27 0 (or 0%) 7 13 53
3/5 = P(s|b) 55 60 47 2/5 = P(¬s|b) 59 64 23
3/4 = P(b|s) 18 3 3 3/4 = P(b|s) 7 0 0
5/7 = P(b) 10 0 0 1/4 = P(¬b|s) 7 3 0
Other 17 20 23 Other 20 20 24
Group 6
0 (or 0%) 47 55 59 1 (or 100%) 27 42 31
1/2 = P(¬s|¬b) 17 21 28 1/2 = P(s|¬b) 20 28 59
2/7 = P(¬b) 10 0 0 0 (or 0%) 13 3 3
1/4 = P(¬b|s) 10 0 0 3/4 = P(b|s) 10 0 0
Other 16 24 13 1/4 = P(¬b|s) 10 3 0
Other 20 24 7
“1/2” was greater in Japanese than in French (p < 0.001) and in
Chinese (p < 0.05), but there was no difference between French
and Chinese (p > 0.05). There were no differences between the
three countries in the other response categories (p > 0.05 for
responses “1,” “0,” “3/4,” and “1/4”).
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the present study was to test Bayesian accounts of
the natural language conditional with Easterners by replicating
the study of Politzer et al. (2010). These accounts imply that
there is a parallel relation between ICs and CBs: both IC and
CB are related to the conditional probability, P(b|s), and both
have a de Finetti table where the false antecedent cases, ¬s,
are void (neither true nor false/neither wins nor loses). This
parallel relationship has been found in the judgments of Western
people about IC and CB (Politzer et al., 2010; Baratgin et al.,
2013).
We considered the hypothesis that Easterners are more
strongly engaged in holistic cognition and pay more attention to a
context as a whole, with the result that both Chinese and Japanese
participants would have a greater tendency, compared to French
participants, to view ¬s cases as relevant, rather than irrelevant,
to the evaluation of conditionals. And our results showed cultural
differences, where the response in Easterners did not equal to
the normative standard of the new paradigm position that P(if
s then b) = P(b|s). We argued that the basis of this response was
not merely a simple mistake, but cultural differences in cognition
might cause the holistic response in Easterners.
In the results, the modal response in all the three countries
of a probability judgment task was the conditional probability
response and was “void” for evaluating ¬s cases. However,
there were cultural differences in response frequency in judging
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the probability of conditionals. Consistent with our hypothesis,
Eastern participants made more holistic responses: they counted
s chips out of all these chips for first P(s), and then they focused
on the true/winning chips b out of s chips P(s) ∗ P(b|s) = P(s & b).
When Easterners judged the probability of false/lose, they also
count s chips out of all chips P(s), and then focused on the
false/losing chips ¬b out of s chips P(s) ∗ P(¬b|s) = P(s & ¬b),
or some subtracted chance of true/win out of all cases, 1
− P(s & b). Furthermore, Eastern participants less frequently
made conditional probability responses than French participants
in CB.
Note that the numerical value of a holistic response is the
same as that of conjunctive response P(s & b), but the process
is different. The conjunctive response just counts the number of
s & b chips out of all chips, while a holistic response needs to
assess the occurrence of s. Although some French participants
made a conjunctive response, only 2% of them wrote down
a calculation consistent with a holistic response. In addition,
with an eye tracking methodology, Baratgin et al. (2017) for
the IC condition and de Gans (2017, Unpublished) for the
bet condition found that French participants give the simple
immediate responses of the ratios for the P(b|s) and P(s &
b) answers. In de Gans (2017, Unpublished), all participants
who gave the conjunction answer simply used the ratio (black
squares)/(total number of chips). Therefore, holistic response,
P(if s then b) = P(s) ∗ P(b|s), is so prominently found in the Asian
participants.
Our results indicate that Easterners had a greater tendency to
take ¬s cases into account when they evaluated the conditionals,
even though they classified ¬s cases as void (neither true nor
false/neither wins nor loses). In addition, in a holistic response,
the chance of true/win (3/7) and false/lose (1/7) did not sum
up to 100%. Therefore, Easterners may have more tolerance for
contradictions, or alternatively Easterners’ interpretation of void
value may be different from that of Westerners. It is possible that
Eastern participants were cognitive misers and did not consider
contradictions. However, there were no cultural differences in
the frequency of the conjunctive probability response, which
might be due to mental shortcutting (Evans et al., 2007). It is
also possible that Eastern participants are sensitive to contextual
information, and they might calculate an EV in bet contexts.
Our CB material had a positive EV with a value of 29 yen, and
therefore participants might think of “lost” of this positive EV in
a¬s case, in which the bet is called off. However, in the evaluation
of false antecedent, ¬s cases, we did not observe any cultural
difference.
Therefore, there are cultural differences in judging the
probability of conditionals, and these cultural differences might
not relate to mental shortcutting or the EV in bet contexts. There
might rather be differences in analytic–holistic cognition (Nisbett
et al., 2001), naïve dialecticism (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009), and
in a context-dependent tendency (Norenzayan et al., 2002). The
tendency in Eastern participants for holistic cognition and naïve
dialecticism might give then a greater tendency to take the whole
set of cases into account and Easterners might consider that ¬s is
void case (neither true nor false/neither wins nor loses) but not
irrelevant to the conditionals.
Furthermore, Eastern participants tended to be affected by
context, and the bet context might increase the availability of
¬s cases. Because “bet is called off ” is more familiar and more
available than “neither true nor false,” Easterners might consider
false antecedent ¬s cases as relevant to the bet as well as
winning and losing cases. Consequently, Easterners made fewer
conditional probability responses, which did not take ¬s cases
into account, in the bet context.
In probability judgments about b and ¬b cases, there was
no difference between Chinese and French participants, and the
results were similar to Politzer et al. (2010). For these questions,
the modal response of winning, given b, was P(s|b), and of
losing, given b, was P(¬s|b). The modal response of winning,
given ¬b, was 0, and of losing, given ¬b, was 1. Politzer et al.
(2010) explained these results as follows: participants tend to
polarize toward winning outcomes, and they consider void cases
as failure to win the bet; consequently, French participants
counted ¬s & b and ¬s & ¬b cases as losing outcomes, as
well as the most basic losing outcome of s & ¬b. Although
both French and Chinese participants showed a similar response
pattern in these cases, it is possible that Chinese participants
calculated differently from French participants. Compared with
French participants, Chinese participants made more holistic
two responses, P(losing) = 1 – P(winning), in the probability
judgment task; therefore, Chinese might have calculated the
probability of winning first, and then calculated the probability
of losing by subtraction, P(losing) = 1 – P(winning), instead of
counting ¬s & b and ¬s & ¬b as losing outcomes.
In the probability judgments about b and ¬b cases, we
observed differences between Japanese and French as well as
Japanese and Chinese: Japanese participants more frequently
answered that the probability of winning, given b, was 1, the
probability of losing, given b, was 0, and losing given ¬b, was
1/2. Because Japanese participants tend to engage in holistic
cognition, they might have a greater tendency to consider
all possible b outcomes, including the “called off,” ¬s, cases.
Similarly, Japanese participants might have a greater tendency
to judge s & ¬b outcomes as losing and ¬s & ¬b as “called
off” outcomes in Group 6 and to judge the probability of
losing, given ¬b, as 1/2. Although there are few cross-cultural
psychological studies comparing differences between Chinese
and Japanese participants, the meta-analytic study of Oyserman
et al. (2002) implied that the Chinese are less individualistic
and more collectivistic than the Japanese. It is then possible that
Chinese participants might focus on all the possible outcomes
and subtract the winning cases from these. Japanese participants
might also focus on the all the cases, but since they may be
relatively more individualistic than the Chinese, they might tend
more to divide all the cases into the components of winning,
losing, and “called off.”
There were further differences in response frequencies of the
“void” response in the two-choice option. Although it did not
reach a statistically significant level in pairwise comparison, the
frequency of “void” in the two-choice option was greater in
French than in Chinese and Japanese participants. For the two-
choice question, the “void” response was not explicitly offered
in the questionnaire, and Chinese and Japanese participants
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“wrote in” this response less often than the French participants,
perhaps because the Chinese and Japanese are more collectivist
and group-oriented (Nisbett et al., 2001), giving them a tendency
not to depart from the given framework.
The present experiment uncovered cultural differences in
conditional reasoning, but it is unclear what factors may affect
such cultural differences, and our results have some implications
for further research. Recent studies of conditionals (Skovgaard-
Olsen et al., 2016; Vidal and Baratgin, 2017) have found
evidence that people’s evaluations of conditionals, where there
is no relevant link between the antecedent and consequent or
antecedent is negatively associated with consequent, can violate
the Equation P(if p then q) = P(q|p). In Westerners, the violation
of the Equation is found for conditionals where p and q are
independent or negatively associated. Our results here suggest
that Easterners are more sensitive to contextual information
such as relevance. It is possible then that there are cultural
differences in perceived relevance, and that Easterners are more
strongly affected by relevance and more frequently violate the
Equation. There are also possible cultural differences in the
interpretation of the “void” value. A meta-analytic review of
truth-table results for conditionals (Schroyens, 2010) found that
“irrelevant” judgments of false antecedent cases was a minor
response for specific tasks (e.g., the implicit negation task), and
“irrelevant” judgments actually meant neither true nor false
and not irrelevant. The present experiment revealed that false
antecedent cases were “void,” neither true/wins nor false/loses,
cases for both Easterners and Westerners, but there were cultural
differences in whether people considered void cases as relevant
for the probability truth/winning or falsity/losing of IC/CB.
Future research on three-valued responses will have to explore the
detailed cultural differences in the meaning of the “void” value.
Finally, individual differences in understanding conditionals will
have to be investigated. The present study did not measure
cognitive styles, but studies in cultural psychology have revealed
that cultural differences in cognitive styles were stable (e.g., Choi
et al., 2007; Na et al., 2010). Previous work attributed individual
differences in conditional reasoning to individual differences
in cognitive ability (e.g., Evans et al., 2007), but the present
study suggests that individual differences in analytic vs. holistic
cognitive styles may affect individual differences in conditional
reasoning.
CONCLUSION
Our results revealed cultural differences in judgments about the
natural language conditional IC and CB. Easterners had a greater
tendency to take whole cases, including void cases, into account,
holistically judging the probability of a conditional to be P(if
s then b) = P(s) ∗ P(b|s). We noted that this holistic response
includes the conditional probability P(b|s), and so Easterners
may understand the conditional as suppositional, as b given s.
In spite of Easterners’ greater holistic tendencies in detail, there
was a high-level of similarity between their responses and those
of Westerners, as predicted by Bayesian accounts of the natural
language IC. The overall modal response for the probability of
the conditional was the conditional probability, and conditionals
were generally given a de Finetti table. The new Bayesian account
of conditionals should look further for cultural differences, and
future research will have to explore detailed cultural differences in
contextual and relevance effects, the meaning of the “void” value
and individual cultural differences in people’s understanding of
conditionals.
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